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INTRODUCTION
Ohio citizens this past fall witnessed one of the most
expensive campaigns in the history of judicial elections, with
nearly ten million dollars spent by candidates and third parties in
the quest for four seats.' The barrage of advertising accompanying
the heavy fundraising was so vitriolic that the Ohio State Bar
Association created a commission to monitor the ads.2 The need
for an impartial and independent judiciary in a legitimate political
system was recognized long before the formation of the United
States 3 and embraced by the founders of this nation.4 In recent
decades, events such as the ones in Ohio have created unease with
judges, the bar, and the general citizenry. 5 The more costly and
competitive elections for judicial seats and the increased role of
special interest groups in judicial campaigns have created the
perception of impartiality in state judges.6 Announce clauses7 in
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004.
1. Molly McDonough, Money and the Bench, Ohio Groups Sling Cash,
Mud in Judicial Election Campaign (Nov. 1, 2002), at WL 42 A.B.A. J. E-
Report 3.
2. Id.
3. See David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the
Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 371 (2001)
(noting that Plutarch recognized the corruption of the judiciary as a key factor in
the decline of the Roman Republic).
4. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton argues
that "[t]he complete independence of the courts is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution." Id.
5. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 273, 275-76 (2002).
6. See Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial
Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv. 819, 819 (2002) ("[E]lections that were once 'low-
key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity,' have become increasingly
politicized, marked by heated charges and sharp criticisms of the records and
decision of sitting judges.").
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state Codes of Judicial Conduct that limit the issues on which a
campaigning judge may speak have long been employed by many
states to address such concerns. 8 However, such clauses may no
longer be an available means for ensuring judicial impartiality in
light of the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which held that the
announce clause in Minnesota's Judicial Canon violates the First
Amendment. 9 The elimination of announce clauses restricting
judicial election speech raises significant concerns about the
perception of judicial impartiality, especially in light of the current
controversy surrounding judicial fundraising.' 0
Part I of this Note reviews the background of the announce
clause in Judicial Canons and lower court interpretations of their
constitutionality." Part I analyzes the White decision regarding
the role of the state judiciary and its connection to the elective
selection method. 12 Part III examines this decision in light of the
current climate of judicial elections, provides an overview of the
potential impacts of the ruling on judicial fundraising, and offers a
brief survey of possible solutions for reconciling these concerns.' 3
I. THE ROAD TO WHITE: PAST CHALLENGES TO ANNOUNCE
CLAUSES
The selection of judges at the state level in the United
States varies widely, with thirty-eight of the fifty states using
7. See infra note 20 and accompanying text for a description of an
announce clause.
8. See Plymouth Nelson, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota's Canon 5
Keeps Incumbents High and Dry While Voters Founder in a Sea of Ignorance,
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1607, 1614-17 (2002).
9. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002).
10. See Amy Longo, Supreme Court Enlarges Scope of Permissible
Speech by Judicial Candidates, Litigation News, Nov. 2002, at 2 ("White will
exacerbate the growing influence of fundraising on judicial elections." (quoting
Deborah Goldberg, Deputy Director of the Democracy Program at the Brennan
Center for Justice)).
11. See infra notes 14-48.
12. See infra notes 49-96.
13. See infra notes 97-127.
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elections for selection or retention of some of their judges. 14 The
format of such elections varies considerably among the states.
Elections are the initial selection method for the judiciary in
twenty-one states, with slightly more than half using non-partisan
ballots and the rest holding partisan elections.15 Some states use
elections to select both appellate and trial court seats; other states
use elections to select only one type of seat. 16 A number of states
use elections exclusively for retention rather than primary
selection, allowing, in effect, a voter referendum after appointment
for a certain term of office.17 As nearly four-fifths of the states use
elections in some form, the issue of free speech in such races has a
nationwide impact.
Since the drafting of the American Bar Association's
[ABA] first Canon of Judicial Ethics in 1924, various clauses have
been adopted by states to regulate appropriate campaign conduct,
including the content of campaign speech.' 8 Two versions of the
Model Code are widely used in a majority of the states. 19 The
1972 version of the Model Code contains an "announce clause"
stating that a candidate for judicial office should not "announce his
or her views on disputed legal or political issues.' 20 Concerns
about the constitutionality of this language prompted the ABA to
14. American Judicature Society, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES:
APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS, 2 (Oct. 2002) at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/Jud%20Sel%20Chart-Oct%202002.pdf. There are
three other commonly used methods of selection-merit selection, executive
appointment or legislative appointment. Id. Sixteen states use a form of merit
commission to select their judges; however, the composition of the membership
of these commissions varies widely from state to state. Id. Selection by the
legislature or executive without the use of a nominating commission is
employed by five states, Id. Finally, nine states use some combination of
approaches to select their judicial branches. Id. No state uses the federal model
in its entirety for selection and retention of judges. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id at 3-9.
17. Id.
18. See Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First
Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REv. 701, 701 (2002).
19. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in
JudicialEthics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 1059, 1065 (1996).
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1) (1972) (amended
1990).
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revise the provision in its 1990 version of the Model Code.21 The
reworded clause instructs candidates to refrain from making
"statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court. ' 22 Additionally, both versions of the Model Code
contain provisions frequently referred to as the "pledges and
promises" clause, that explicitly forbid candidates to make specific
pledges or promises regarding the outcome of cases.23
The revised announce clause in the 1990 Model Code did
not allay concerns about the limits imposed by this restriction on
speech. The provision was quickly challenged in a number of
states which had adopted the revised language, beginning in
Florida in 1990.24 In ACLU v. Florida Bar, the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, which used the revised version of the announce
clause, was challenged on First Amendment grounds as a content-
based restriction on candidate speech.25 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida, using a strict scrutiny
analysis, enjoined the use of the clause on the grounds that such a
provision was not the least restrictive means available for the state
to ensure the compelling interest of an impartial judiciary.26
The ruling in ACLU was followed by a series of challenges
in other states to both the "announce" and "pledge and promise"
27provisions. As federal and state courts began to enjoin use of
both clauses in the early 1990s, some distinctions began to emerge
in the rulings. 28  Some courts upheld Canon provisions for
21. SeeNelson, supra note 8, at 1615-1616.
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
23. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (A)(3)(d)(i) (1990);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (B)(1) (1972) (amended 1990).
24. See ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1097-99.
27. See Shepard, supra note 19, at 1070-74.
28. See Beshear v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229, 1231, 1234 (E.D. Ark. 1991)
(enjoining enforcement of Canon 7 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct
for campaign promise by judicial candidate to not permit plea bargaining if
elected) rev'd, 966 F.2d 1458 (8th Cir. 1992), remanded to 863 F.Supp. 913,
918 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (enjoining enforcement of Canon 7 against the judicial
candidate); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 953-54 (Ky. 1991) (finding
for judicial candidate subjected to disciplinary action for criticisms of previously
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adjudicatory pledges, but enjoined Code provisions that restricted
speech regarding administrative promises.29  This trend for
upholding broader announce clause provisions turned again after
the 1993 Seventh Circuit decision, Buckley v. Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Board.30  The Seventh Circuit held that the announce
clause was unconstitutional in preventing a candidate from
promoting his past record of decisions in specific types of cases. 3'
Like many of the earliest decisions regarding the provisions, the
court posited that such prohibitions were overbroad, preventing
virtually any comment from a candidate. 32 Such restrictions during
election time "would deprive the audience of the show,"
preventing voters from obtaining relevant information about
candidates.33 As a result, the restriction failed to pass a strict
scrutiny analysis.
3 4
The United States Supreme Court resolved the dispute
among lower courts during the 2002 term in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White.3 5 Gregory Wersal, a Minnesota attorney, first36
ran for a position on the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1996. In
the course of the election, he criticized several decisions of that
court on issues such as crime, welfare and abortion. 37  These
criticisms were challenged as violations of Minnesota's announce
decided cases, specific legal rules and standard of review in worker's
compensation cases).
29. See Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F.
Supp. 309, 315-16 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (enjoining enforcement of Arkansas Code
of Judicial Conduct with regards to candidate's campaign promises on
administrative improvements but upholding Code with regards to discussion of
general legal issues); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 763 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (enjoining enforcement of Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon which prevented comment on disputed legal or political issues), aff'd in
part and vacated in part by, 944 F.2d 137, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding
Canon as narrowly construed on basis of compelling interest of state in judicial
quality and integrity).
30. Buckley v. i11. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
31. Id. at 231.
32. See id. at 228-29.
33. See id. at 229.
34. Id. at 229.
35. 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
36. Id. at 2531.
37. Id.
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clause, and although subsequently dismissed, resulted in Wersal's
withdrawal from the race. 38 Wersal made a second attempt for the
same office in 1998, 39 and sought an advisory opinion from the
supervising Lawyers Board to determine what views he could
safely announce at the start of his campaign. 40 The Board refused
the request on the grounds that Wersal had not given any specific
examples of announcements upon which the Board could rule.4'
Wersal then filed suit in Federal District Court seeking an
injunction against enforcement of the clause and challenging its
constitutionality as a violation of the First Amendment.42
In a five to four decision, the Court held that the announce
clause in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct 43 violated the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech." Justice Scalia,
writing for the plurality, interpreted the announce clause broadly,
arguing that the clause prohibited a judicial candidate "from stating
his views on any specific nonfanciful legal question within the
province of the court for which he is running," with only a few
exceptions, such as past decisions.45 Justice Scalia emphasized
that election speech has continuously been recognized as a core
First Amendment freedom which merits the highest protection
from governmental intrusion.46 In applying a strict scrutiny
analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that the provision was not
narrowly tailored enough to serve the compelling state interests of
either judicial impartiality or the public perception of judicial
impartiality.47 The ruling was limited to the Minnesota announce
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2531-2532.
40. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2532 (2002).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 2534 n.5. The announce clause in question, Minn. Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000), adopts the language of the 1972
Model Code. Id Oral arguments by the respondents suggested that this earlier
version was no broader in scope than the more specific 1990 revision. Id.
However, the Court noted that the constitutional analysis did not turn on this
distinction. Id.
44. Id. at 2542.
45. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 (2002).
46. See id. at 2538.
47. See id. at 2535.
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clause and did not address the unchallenged "pledges and
promises" prohibition in the Minnesota Code.48
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANNOUNCE CLAUSES UNDER WHITE
The First Amendment has been construed by the courts to
indicate that campaign speech deserves the "highest protection," as
that speech is at the root of the American system of government.49
Such a strong commitment to election speech, repeatedly upheld in
races involving executive and legislative offices, faces a unique
challenge with regard to the judicial branch.50 As discussed in this
section, varying perceptions on the nature of the elected office in
White clearly divide the members of the Court on this issue. As
sitting Justices on the highest court in the nation, all nine are
familiar with the responsibilities of a judge as a neutral arbiter of
48. See id. at 2532, 2554-59 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). The "pledges and
promises" provision formed a large part of Justice Ginsburg's dissent. She
argued that the two provisions operated in tandem. Id. The announce clause
was essential if the pledges and promises provision, a prohibition all parties
agreed was necessary, was essential. Id. Eliminating this provision opened the
door for candidates to "announce" their views in a thinly-disguised promise to
rule in a particular fashion upon election. Id.
49. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 222-23 (1989) ("We have recognized repeatedly that 'debate on the
qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.' Indeed, the First Amendment 'has
its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office.") (internal citations omitted); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45,
52-54 (1982) (internal citations omitted). The Court stated in Brown:
[I]f it be conceded that the First Amendment was
'fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people,' then it can hardly be doubted
that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office. The political candidate
does not lose the protection of the First Amendment
when he declares himself for public office.
Id.
50. See Behrens, supra note 5, at 277-78. Behrens and Silverman argue,
"[E]lections threaten judicial independence by pressuring judges to follow the
will of the majority, which may run counter to the rule of law." Id.
2003]
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the law. However, only two, Justices Souter and O'Connor, have
experience as state court judges, and only one, Justice O'Connor,
was elected to a state judicial post. 51 This knowledge of the
responsibilities of the bench, but unfamiliarity with the unique role
of state judges, produces a fractured decision that provides no
guidance to states on how to ensure impartiality in the increasingly
costly and contentious world of judicial elections. White provides
no clear majority analysis as to what type of restriction, if any,
would satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis and legitimize the
recognized state interest in regulating speech in judicial elections.
A. The Majority
Five Justices joined together to hold that Minnesota's
announce clause is a violation of the First Amendment.5 2 Three
Justices reached this conclusion by finding that the clause was not
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interests of impartiality
advanced by the state.53 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia
adopted a narrow definition of impartiality: the "lack of bias for or
against either party to the proceeding ... equal application of the
law.",54 This definition recognized only the obligation of a judge to
ensure due process,55 and rejected the more expansive definitions
of impartiality as a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view," 56 or a judge's open-minded "willingness to
consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to
persuasion. ' 57  Using this restricted definition, Justice Scalia
51. See Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf. Justice Souter
served by appointment on the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Justice
O'Conner was elected as a Superior Court judge in Arizona prior to appointment
on the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id.
52. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2535 (2002).
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed




56. Id. at 2536.
57. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2536-37 (2002).
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determined that the announce clause was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to pass the strict scrutiny analysis recuired by a challenge
to the fundamental right of campaign speech.
This narrower definition of impartiality reflected Justice
Scalia's view that state judiciaries play a broad role as
policymakers, and thus their election serves a purpose similar to
those for legislature and executive offices. Justice Scalia noted
that, "[n]ot only do state-court judges possess the power to 'make'
common law, but they have immense power to shape the States'
constitutions as well ... . Which is precisely why the election of
state judges became popular. 59
This acknowledgment of the unique role of the state
judiciary was echoed in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Justice
Kennedy recognized the right of states to select judges in a manner
that suits their judicial needs.60 He noted that the Court should
refrain from criticism of the states' selection methods, because
such criticism "implicitly condemns countless elected state judges
... without warrant."6' Justice Kennedy went even further than
the majority in recognizing the unique role of state judges, when he
stated that no traditional exception would justify content-based
restrictions on judicial election speech.62
The historical record and state governmental structure
supports the majority view of the role of state judges as policy-
58. Id. at 2535.
59. id. at 2539-40. This argument is further put into context by the
statement immediately preceding: "This complete separation of the judiciary
from the enterprise of 'representative government' might have some truth in
those countries where judges neither make law themselves not set aside the laws
enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of the American system." Id
60. Id. at 2545-46.
61. Id. at 2545-46. Justice Kennedy concludes that many state judges,
"despite the difficulties imposed by the election system, have discovered the law
of enlightenment, instruction, and inspiration that make them independent-
minded and faithful jurists of real integrity." Id.
62. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2544 (2002).
Justice Kennedy argues that, "Content-based speech restrictions that do not fall
within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into
narrow tailoring or compelling government interests. The speech at issue here
does not come within any of the exceptions to the First Amendment recognized
by the Court." Id.
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makers. The development of judicial elections, an outgrowth of
the Jacksonian period of democratic reform, first began in
Mississippi in 1812.63 In colonial times, judges traditionally were
appointed either through the executive and legislative branches or
some process of joint selection between the two branches. 64
Scholars of the late nineteenth century attributed the change in
selection of judges to the sentiment and emotion of the early
1800s, where many traditionally-appointed offices were converted
to elected positions to ensure the power of the people.65 However,
more modem scholars have insisted that the real inclination behind
the move to an elected third branch was, in fact, to ensure the
impartiality of the judiciary from the legislative and executive
branches, which many at the time feared had grown too powerful.
66
The decision by many states to reject the federal model and
subject their judiciary to periodic elections also suggests that a
primary concern was making the judiciary politically responsive to
the people.67 Elected state judges were not intended by their states
to be independent in the same manner as the federal judiciary;
rather, they were intended to be autonomous of the other branches,
while maintaining accountability to the people. 68
The need for greater responsiveness at the state level was
directly related to the larger policy-making role of state judges in
their routine development of substantive common law, a task not
shared by federal courts. 6 9 The fact that the state judiciary is at
63. See Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just A River In Egypt: A Thorough
Review of Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in
Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (2001).
64. Id. at 628-29.
65. See Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the
Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
190, 190-91 (1993).
66. Id. at 193.
67. Id. at 198.
68. Id. at 196-97.
69. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the
state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
[Vol. I
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times another policy-making branch lends credence to the decision
to elect these individuals.70
In addition to their function as makers of common law,
state courts often occupy a more active, less restrained role in state
government than the federal judiciary. Unlike federal courts, some
state judiciaries issue advisory opinions,7 1 author public statements
on constitutional rights,72 and perform administrative functions
beyond those handled by the federal courts. 73 Many judiciary
clauses in state constitutions lack the language in Article III of the
United States Constitution, which limits justiciability of the federal
courts through the "case or controversy" requirement.74 While all
fifty states have adopted a similar model of three branches subject
to checks and balances, they do not mirror precisely those of the
federal government. 75 Thus, state judiciaries have a more active
federal concern. There is no federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state whether they
be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.
Id.
70. Michael DeBow et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for
Partisan Judicial Elections, The Federalist Society at http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/WhitePapers/judicialelection.htm (last visited March 15,
2003) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
71. See Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 1302, 1303 (1956) (noting that at least nine state courts issue advisory
opinions authorized by constitutional or statutory provision).
72. Helen Hershoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1834, 1875-76 (2001).
73. Id. at 1836-37.
74. Id. at 1879-80. This limitation on the federal judiciary, with its unique
shield of lifetime appointment, is necessary in the structure of the federal
separation of powers. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
75. Rogan Kersh, Suzanne B. Mettler, Grant D. Reeher & Jeffery M.
Stonecash, "More a Distinction of Words Than Things": The Evolution of
Separated Powers in the American States, 4 RoGER WILLIAMS U.L. REv. 5, 9
(1998). See also Risea v. Thompson, 930 F. 2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1991).
[T]he Constitution does not require a state to imitate
the separation of powers prescribed for the federal
government by the Constitution. It therefore does not
2003]
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and broader role in state governance, checked by increased
political accountability, while federal courts operate in a more
restricted role, but are not subject to the political pressures of state
judges.
The role of state courts presented by the majority, while
accurately reflecting the nature of state judiciaries as distinct from
federal, is not entirely complete, as the dissenters in White
illustrated. Five members of the court clearly exhibited some
discomfort with the role of the judge as a political actor.76
B. The Dissent
The tension created by requiring a judge to fill the role of
both impartial decision-maker and political creature led the
dissenters to insist that this very dichotomy compelled removal of
judicial elections from the realm of the fundamental protection of
election speech provided in the First Amendment.77 Both Justices
Stevens and Ginsberg stressed in their dissents that the premise of
a judgeship being the same as any other political office was
fundamentally flawed.78
require a state to allocate powers among the branches
of state government in the same manner in which the
Constitution prescribes that allocation among the
branches of the federal government.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring, Ginsburg, J. and Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Breyer, J. and Souter, J.).
77. Id. at 2551 (Ginsburg J. dissenting) ("Thus the rationale underlying
unconstrained speech in elections for political office-that representative
government depends on the public's ability to choose agents who will act at its
behest-does not carry over to campaigns for the bench.").
78. Id. at 2546 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Elected judges, no less than
appointed judges, occupy a position of trust that is fundamentally different from
that occupied by policymaking officials."). See also id. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) ("Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges perform a




Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the unique aspect of the
judicial office in comparison with other elected officials. 79 He
argued that past decisions by the Court have required a
disinterested judiciary. 8° He noted that throughout the Anglo-
American legal tradition, judges have been held as critically
different from other public officials, as the issues they are called
upon to decide (issues of law and fact) should not be made upon
the basis of popular opinion, but upon the rule of law.81 "[I]ssues
of policy are properly decided by majority vote; it is the business
of legislators and executives to be popular."
82
Justice Ginsburg focused on the special role of courts in the
government structure, arguing that judges are not "political actors"
and that Minnesota's system of judicial selection did not intend to
make them so.s3  Echoing Justice Stevens' contention, Justice
Ginsburg noted that rather than representing a constituency, judges
represented the law.84 A judge's mission is to "decide individual
cases and controversies on individual records, neutrally applying
legal principles and when necessary, 'stand[ing] up to what is
generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will."'"
Like the majority analysis, there is also historical support
for the view presented by the dissenters. The possibility of
impartiality in an elected judiciary was contemplated by many of
the earliest state conventions that instituted elections at the state
level.8 6 Most concluded that the need to run for office would not
create an inherent bias in the judiciary because of the unique role
79. id. at 2548.
80. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2549 (2002)
(Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens further notes that judges do not serve
constituencies in the same manner as other public officials: "The legitimacy of
the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and
nonpartisanship. The reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches
to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action." Id. (quoting
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)).
81. Id. at 2547.
82. ld. at 2547.
83. Id. at 2551-53 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
84. Id. at 2550.
85. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2549 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
86. See Nelson, supra note 65, at 194-97,
20031
of the judge.87  Debates at these conventions reveal that most
delegates perceived a difference in the roles of the legislature and
judiciary. Members of the general assemblies were expected to
express positions on issues and then presumably to follow those
positions in representing the citizens. 89 A judge was viewed less as
a creator, like the legislator, and more as a scientist or engineer,
working with a concrete set of rules to apply fairly and impartially
the laws as written.90 Thus, the records of the debates of the
inception of judicial elections serve to support the dissenters'
views of a judiciary with an inherently different role than the more
policy-oriented legislature.
In addition to the views of the dissenters, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence took issue with the majority view of the
judge as a political actor. Although she joined the majority in
White, she wrote a separate concurrence focusing on what she
perceived as the inherent impartiality created by the existence of
judicial elections, which undermined the state's alleged compelling
interest in regulating speech in those races. 9 1  She defined
impartiality as "being free from any personal stake in the outcome
of the cases to which [judges] are assigned., 92  However, she
argued that regular elections force judges to perceive they in fact
do have a stake in every highly-publicized case decided because of
the potential impact on their re-election prospects. 93 She joined the
majority on the basis that Minnesota opted to use a method of
selection which inherently resulted in bias and could not, therefore,
rely on a compelling interest of preventing bias to justify
burdening free speech.
87. Id. at 210-14.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 211.
90. Id.
91. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2544 (2002)
(O'Connor, J. concurring) ("If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality,
it is largely one the state brought upon itself by continuing the practice of
popularly electing justices.").
92. Id. at 2542.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2544.
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C. The Road Ahead
These differing lines of analysis by members of the Court
leave no clear roadmap for states that wish to prevent potential due
process concerns and to preserve the impartiality of the judiciary in
a broader sense than defined by Justice Scalia's opinion. Justice
O'Connor's opinion suggested that states can never argue they
have a compelling interest in impartiality as long as they use
elections as a selection method. Justice Kennedy's opinion also
took the extreme stance that no encumbrance on the content of a
judicial candidate's speech would ever be acceptable. His position
contrasts with the much broader view taken by the dissenters that
the state had a compelling interest in preserving judicial
impartiality in light of the unique role of judges as impartial
arbiters of the law. Finally, Justice Scalia's opinion leaves some
possibility that a state could regulate speech to preserve the
impartiality of the judiciary. His opinion recognized the
legitimacy of judicial elections, but did not go so far as to indicate
that judicial and legislative elections were identical. 95 Rather, his
holding is limited to ensuring a strict scrutiny analysis for
regulation of speech in judicial election campaigns. 96
III. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE WAKE OF WHITE
The White Court clearly held that announce clauses fail to
pass constitutional muster as a method of regulating judicial
elections. Beyond this, however, the divided Court provided no
clear directions to states on how to handle key issues raised by the
elimination of such speech restrictions. One of the most pivotal of
these key issues is the closely-connected concern of judicial
fundraising.97
95. Id. at 2539.
96. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2539 (2002).
97. See id. at 2554-59 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). This paper does not
address the potential increase in due process violations addressed by Justice
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg argues that commitment of
judges to an issue, whether in general terms or explicit promises, creates a due
process violation if the judge is later called upon to rule on that issue. Id. For
further discussion of this issue, see generally Bamhizer, supra note 3. Bamhizer
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A. The Growing Problems in Judicial Fundraising
The funding of judicial elections has become a major
concern for many members of the legal community and the
citizenry as a whole as the cost of judicial elections has rapidly
risen.9 8 Fundraising for judicial seats has skyrocketed in the most
recent campaign cycles.99 Whether or not there is an actual impact
on judicial decisions as costs have risen, citizens' perceptions of
the impact of campaign contributions have arguably undermined
the impartiality of the judiciary. 00 Judges are also aware of the
suggests one solution could be to adopt more liberal rules and statutes that
provide further opportunities for recusal of judges, to address due process
concerns, or to require disqualification of a judge in cases where the issue
statements during the campaign cast doubt on the judge's ability to rule
impartially. id. He further notes that such a remedy would increase judicial
costs and could be construed as electoral fraud for failing to carry out the voters'
wishes in selecting members for the bench whose rulings would reflect certain
positions on issues. Id.
98. See Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 361.
99. Terry Carter, Footing the Billfor Judicial Campaigns, North Carolina
Enacts Law for Public Financing of Judicial Elections (Oct. 18, 2002), at WL
40 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1. Carter reports that during the 2000 election cycle,
nationwide fundraising for judicial campaigns rose to more than $45 million, a
sixty-one percent increase over the 1998 elections. Id. See also McDonough,
supra note 1. McDonough indicates that results from 2002 campaigns are likely
to be even higher, with initial reports from races for four seats on the Ohio
Supreme Court indicating that $5.5 million had been raised by candidates in that
state alone. Id.
100. See Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 370-71. Surveys of voters have
indicated that this is a common perception. See Justice at Stake Frequency
Questionnaire 7, at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResuts.pdf. This 2001
survey of voters found two-thirds of respondents believed favorable judicial
treatment was received by litigants who made contributions to a judge's
candidacy. Id. The same survey found that seventy-six percent of voters
thought campaign contributions influenced the outcome of judicial decisions.
Id. See also National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State
Courts: A 1999 National Survey 8, at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.
pdf. This 1999 survey revealed similar responses, where seventy-eight percent
of those surveyed believed that elected judges were influenced by having to
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growing importance of fundraising and the potential for
impartiality it can create.' 0
1
There are two possible outcomes of the interaction between
fundraising and the broader judicial election speech now permitted
by White. Arguably, in striking down the announce clause
provision, the Supreme Court's decision may cure some of the
concerns about impartiality raised by judicial fundraising. As
candidates make positions known, donors with similar viewpoints
and policy perspectives will naturally gravitate to support like-
minded candidates.'0 2  This weakens the assertion that a
contribution has swayed the judge's viewpoint, since the
articulated judicial philosophy is arguably the draw for the funding
rather than the funding motivating the judge's previously unknown
position on an issue.163 Some would further argue the elimination
of the announce clause will make it easier for candidates to avoid
financial entanglement, as they can better distinguish themselves
through their personal philosophy and decrease reliance on name
recognition promoted by heavy campaign spending.'04
raise funds for campaigns, and eighty-one percent though that political
considerations influenced judicial decisions. Id
101. See Justice at Stake-State Judges Frequency Questionnaire 4-5, at
http://faircourts.org/files/JASJudgesSurveyResults.pdf. This nationwide survey
indicated that more than ninety percent of judges felt some to a great deal of
pressure to raise money during election years. Id. Further, nearly a third of
judges believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions. Id.
The surveyed judges were nearly equally divided on this issue, with
approximately a third believing there was some to great influence, another third
who believed there was little to no influence, and nearly 20 percent who were
unsure. Id. Appellate court judges tended to be more equally divided on this
issue, while trial court judges were more likely to believe there was no
influence. Id.
102. Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 363.
103. See id. (arguing that any increase in contributions could occur only
because contributors feel certain the candidates would support their positions).
104. See Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial
Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992)
(arguing that greater information on issues may decrease the current focus on
non-substantive factors, such as age, race, gender, physical appearance, or name
recognition gleamed primarily from the ballot, and serve to further engage
voters in the process of judicial elections).
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However, such openness in judicial speech is more likely to
have the opposite effect. Expressing a view reinforced by like-
minded funding sources creates an implicit promise to uphold such
views when deliberating on the bench.'0 5 The additional element
of funding in support of this position is likely to increase these
commitments. In controversial areas of law such as capital
punishment, evidence suggests that judges who rule, or fail to rule,
in particular ways do in fact face voter wrath.'0 6 The public's
awareness of rulings which contradict a judge's previously-stated
positions, relied upon by voters in casting their ballots, may
therefore significantly decrease chances of re-election for judges
who follow the rule of law rather than their stated beliefs in
determining cases.
Additionally, as costs for races continue to rise, candidates
may begin to tailor issue statements solely to attract donations,
making them far more subject to criticism than under the current
system, where there is no explicit statement in support of the
contributors' views. 1  Thus, more open election speech is likely
to decrease the perception of fairness, if not actual impartiality, of
elected judges who are viewed as captured by special interests.'0 8
In addition to the potential for bias towards certain special
interest groups in judicial decision-making, many fear the pressure
to announce on issues which garner public support will slant
judicial deliberations toward the majority view rather than a fair
and independent analysis of the law.'0 9 Some research suggests
that an individual, when exposed to an audience as a judge is in an
election, will attempt to act in a manner in which the audience will
approve, over time developing a strong pressure from the
constituency to be a dedicated advocate for their preferred
105. Brian Morris, Free Speech in Judicial Elections, 27 MONT. LAw 5, 7
(2002).
106. Charles F. Baird, See Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do
Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process In Capital
Cases? 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 123, 134 (1999).
107. Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 364-65.
108. See id. at 371.
109. See Neil K. Sethi, The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed
Constitutional Speech Restriction for Judicial Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REv.
711,721-22 (1997).
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outcomes.110 Judges who announce views which appeal to the
majority of the voting populace in order to win elections may find
themselves over time unable to engage in neutral, detached
decision-making because of their commitment to their announced
positions. The United States Supreme Court recognized the
possibility of unconscious judicial commitment to a position in In
re Murchinson, which held that a judge sitting on the criminal trial
of a defendant whom he had formerly indicted violated due
process."' Such a sublimation of majority voter views in the
judicial branch raises concerns about the ability to protect minority
rights and impartially decide unpopular legal issues.' 12
B. Solutions to the Problems of Judicial Impartiality
If these types of negative impacts are the result of the
aftermath of the White decision, they may serve as a catalyst for
significant reform in judicial election finance. Several options
exist for states who wish to approach the judicial impartiality issue
through fundraising reform.
One possible solution is public financing for judicial
elections. Public financing would alleviate the need for
fundraising and decrease some of the negative impacts of judicial
issue speech. One state, North Carolina, has recently implemented
a new fundraising scheme in an attempt to mitigate some of the
inherent problems of judicial fundraising. 113  Unlike prior
legislation in this area which enacted donation limits but
maintained a direct link between contributors and candidates, this
recently-enacted legislation established a fund to finance fully
general judicial elections." 4  Although participation in the fund
110. Id. at 722.
111. In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1955) ("Having been a part
of that process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.").
112. Sethi, supra note 109, at 721-722.
113. Justice at Stake Press Release, North Carolina Adopts Public
Financing For Supreme Court and Appellate Judicial Campaigns 1 (Oct. 10,
2002) at http://faircourts.org/files/NCsigning.pdf.
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278 (2002). This fund will be available to
candidates starting in 2004. Id.
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program is voluntary, it provides an attractive source of funding,
because the legislation also places stricter contribution limits on
those who elect to raise funds privately."15 The legislation also
addresses the issue of voter information by providing for a state-
wide judicial voters' guide, including general information and brief
statements by each candidate." 6 Several other states are currently
considering similar legislation." 7 This type of reform may serve
to reduce some of the problems of judicial campaign speech, as
fundraising becomes a less important element of campaigns.
However, the United States Supreme Court limited its regulation in
the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo because money is a form of
speech itself. 18 Nonetheless, limits such as those enacted by
North Carolina will likely survive a constitutional challenge due to
their voluntary nature. 1
9
States might rather employ a system of voluntary public
funding as an incentive to candidates who avoid issue speech
during campaigns altogether.' 20  It is unclear whether such an
incentive to restrict speech would be constitutional, and such a
program would have to be examined under the unconstitutional
115. See Carter, supra note 99.
116., North Carolina Adopts Public Financing, supra note 113, at 1.
117. Id. at 1-2. Interest groups, legislators, governors and members of the
courts in Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Texas and Wisconsin have
begun to push for public financing ofjudicial elections in those states.
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
The First Amendment denies the government the
power to determine that spending to promote one's
political views is wasteful, excessive or unwise. In the
free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political
committees who must retain control over the quantity
and range of debate on public issues in a political
campaign.
Id.
119. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 823-24 (suggesting that as long as such
funding schemes are voluntary and do not force candidates to accept public
funding, they will be found constitutional).
120. Id. at 820-21.
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conditions doctrine established by the Court.' 21 A program
conditioning the receipt of public campaign funds on a prospective
candidate's willingness to abide by speech restrictions may be
unconstitutional if it does not permit outside fundraising, thereby
causing all of the candidate's speech to be restricted.122 However,
a narrowly-drawn restriction, in combination with a voluntary
program, might be constitutional if it does not unduly infringe on a
candidate's right to free speech in light of the compelling
governmental interest of judicial impartiality.' 23
A more drastic solution for remedying the dual problems of
speech and campaign finance would be to adopt Justice
O'Connor's suggestion to eliminate judicial elections altogether. 24
States may consider switching from elections to a merit or
appointment based system of judicial selection, which uses some
combination of the executive, legislature or independent
commission to select the candidates for office, sometimes followed
by retention elections. 125 However, such an alternate system may
not reflect the state's desire for accountability to the citizenry
rather than other branches of state government. 26 Political trends
suggest that such a reform may enjoy mixed popular support.
Despite strong advocacy from the American Bar Association for
merit-based judicial reform, no states have adopted merit selection
at any level in nearly a decade. 27
121. Id. at 828-29. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires the
consideration of several factors in determining if a condition attached to a
subsidy in an unconstitutional constraint on speech. Id. These factors include
whether the grant promotes governmental speech or private speech, whether the
condition constitutes viewpoint discrimination, whether the condition applies to
all the grantee's speech or only to the speech subsidized by the grant, and
whether the grant can be said to distort a medium of expression. Id.
122. Id at 832.
123. See id at 836.
124. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542-44
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also supra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text.
125. See Behrens, supra note 5, at 299-300.
126. See DeBow et.al., supra note 70.
127. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures,
and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 20 (1994).
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IV. THE ROAD AFTER WHITE
Private action may serve to curb potential excesses in
fundraising and impartiality, even though state governments may
be reluctant to change due to uncertainty as to what action may be
constitutional in light of White."' Initial reaction to the outcome
in White suggests development at the state level of a more activist
bar and self-policing judiciary in an attempt to preserve the
integrity of the court. On a national level, the President of the
American Bar Association, Alfred P. Carlton, recently created the
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary to examine problems
with judicial selection methods, including speech and fundraising
issues.' 
30
Challenges to restrictions on judicial campaigns have
already begun to emerge in the wake of White. In October of
2002, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down several
provisions in the Georgia Canon of Judicial Conduct, including
restrictions on misleading campaign speech and judicial
solicitation of campaign funds, citing White as a basis for the
ruling.13  This decision confirms that the outcome in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White has added an additional layer to the
128. William F. Dressel, Judicial Independence-Free Speech Means
Impartiality, 10 Nev. Lawyer 35 (Aug. 2002). Dressel, President of the National
Judicial College, suggested in reaction to the decision that judges would have to
become more self-policing in their campaigns to maintain the integrity of the
office. Id.
129. Fred Engler Jr., Judges, Politics, and The First Amendment (Aug. 9,
2002), available at WL 4 No. 16 Lawyers J. 4. Engler, President of the
Allegheny County Bar Association, has suggested that bar associations will need
to become more active in working with judicial candidates to ensure open
speech does not result in a negative perception of the judiciary. Id He
suggested that some type of campaign finance reform for judicial elections
would be necessary to ensure that the speech offered provided solid and reliable
information for voters, rather than a method of attracting campaign funds, but
that this might be done through voluntary agreements between the bar and
judicial candidates, even if states did not pass actual legislation. Id
130. McDonough, supra note 1.
131. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312,1319 (11th Cir. 2002). See also
David L. Hudson Jr., Georgia Judicial Candidates Free to Speak, Federal
Appeals Court Strikes Campaign Speech Regulations (Oct. 25, 2002), at WL 41
A.B.A. J. E-Report 2.
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current uncertain climate of judicial selection.' 32 The decision will
likely have a significant effect on judicial fundraising and
exacerbate the public's negative perception of elections. 133 As a
result, despite the lack of direction from the Court, the uncertainty
and dissatisfaction of judges, the bar, and citizens may spark
crucial changes in judicial elections.' 34
132. See supra notes 49-96 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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